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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing is significant to the security of face
recognition systems. Previous works on depth super-
vised learning have proved the effectiveness for face anti-
spoofing. Nevertheless, they only considered the depth as
an auxiliary supervision in the single frame. Different
from these methods, we develop a new method to estimate
depth information from multiple RGB frames and propose
a depth-supervised architecture which can efficiently en-
codes spatiotemporal information for presentation attack
detection. It includes two novel modules: optical flow
guided feature block (OFFB) and convolution gated re-
current units (ConvGRU) module, which are designed to
extract short-term and long-term motion to discriminate
living and spoofing faces. Extensive experiments demon-
strate that the proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art
results on four benchmark datasets, namely OULU-NPU,
SiW, CASIA-MFSD, and Replay-Attack.
1. Introduction
Face recognition systems have become indispensable in
many interactive AI systems for its convenience. However,
most of existing face recognition systems are so vulnera-
ble to the face spoofing that attackers can easily deceive
face recognition systems by using presentation attacks (PA),
e.g., printing a face on paper (print attack), replaying a face
on a digital device (replay attack), and bringing a 3D-mask
(3D-mask attack). Such PAs can tamper with face recog-
nition systems, placing direct risks to money payment and
privacy verification that have high stakes with the public in-
terests. Therefore, face anti-spoofing plays a critically im-
portant role in the security of face recognition.
∗denotes corresponding author.
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Figure 1. To observe the difference between live and spoof(print
attack here) scenes, we represent the micro motion exaggeratedly.
The angle of camera viewpoint can reflect the facial motion rela-
tive depth among different keypoints. In the living scene (a), the
angle α between nose and right ear is getting smaller with the face
moving right (α > β2), while the angle β2 between left ear and
nose is getting larger (β1 < γ). However, in the spoofing scene
(b), α′ < β′2, and β′1 > γ′.
To defend against face spoofing attacks, a great num-
ber of face anti-spoofing methods [5, 14, 21, 23] have been
proposed to discriminate the living and fake face. Previ-
ous approaches fall into two categories. The first is the
traditional methods, which commonly train shallow classi-
fiers with hand-crafted features, i.e., LBP [10], SIFT [26],
or SURF [6]. With only texture characteristic considered,
these methods are often prone to the attacks, such as re-
playing mediums and 2D/3D mask. In contrast to texture-
based methods, CNN-based methods provide an alterna-
tive way to learn discriminative anti-spoofing representa-
tions in an end-to-end fashion. Some CNN-based meth-
ods [21, 23, 14, 34, 35, 30] only treat face anti-spoofing as
a pure binary classification - spoofing as 0 and living as 1,
and train the neural network supervised by simple softmax
loss. However, these methods fail to explore the nature of
spoof patterns [20], which consist of skin detail loss, color
distortion, moire´ pattern, motion pattern, shape deformation
and spoofing artifacts.
Depth supervised face anti-spoofing somehow relieves
these issues. Intuitively, images of living faces contain face-
like depth information, whereas spoofing face images in
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print and replay carriers only have planar depth informa-
tion. Thus, Atoum et al. [2] and Liu et al. [20] proposes
single-frame depth supervised CNN architecture in their ar-
chitecture, and improves the performance of presentation
attack detection (PAD). However, they only leverage facial
depth as an auxiliary strong supervision to detect the static
spoofing cues under pixel-wise supervision relatively care-
fully, neglecting to exploit the virtual depth difference be-
tween living and spoofing scenes. To compensate with the
lack of temporal information, Liu et al. [20] takes rPPG sig-
nals as extra supervisory cues, and does not use any depth
information in temporal domain. However, depth informa-
tion is more obvious in sequential frames. Indeed, temporal
motion is very useful to extract depth information and thus
play a great potential role for face anti-spoofing detection.
In this paper, we will explore the temporal depth by
combining temporal motion and facial depth, and demon-
strate that face anti-spoofing can be significantly benefit
from temporal facial depth. No matter whether cameras
or subjects move, sequential frames can be represented in
a 3D space using the relative motion of objects. Inspired
by the work [29] revealing the relationship between relative
facial depth and the motion, we believe patterns of motion
and depth are distinct between living and spoofing scenes.
And the abnormal facial depth will reflect on the unique
facial motion pattern in the temporal domain. Fig. 1 il-
lustrates apparently different temporal representations be-
tween living and spoofing scenes. To this end, we present
a novel depth supervised neural network architecture with
optical flow guided feature block (OFFB) and convolution
gated recurrent units (ConvGRU) module to incorporate the
temporal information from both adjacent and long-sequence
frames, respectively. By combining both short-term and
long-term motion extractors, the temporal motion can be
used effectively to discriminate living and spoofing faces
under depth supervision. And to estimate facial depth in
face anti-spoofing tasks, we propose a novel contrastive
depth loss to learn topography of facial points.
We summarize the main contributions below:
• We analyze the temporal depth in face anti-spoofing
and seek the usefulness of motion and depth in face
anti-spoofing.
• We propose a novel depth supervised architecture with
OFF block (OFFB) and ConvGRU module to uncover
facial depths and their unique motion patterns from
temporal information of monocular frame sequences.
• We design a contrastive depth loss to learn the topog-
raphy of facial points for depth supervised face anti-
spoofing.
• We demonstrate the superior performances to the state-
of-the-art methods on widely used face anti-spoofing
benchmarks.
2. Related Work
We review related face anti-spoofing works in three cate-
gories: binary supervised methods, depth supervised meth-
ods, and temporal-based methods.
Binary supervised Methods Since face anti-spoofing is
essentially a binary classification problem, most of previ-
ous anti-spoofing methods purely train a classifier under bi-
nary supervision, e.g., spoofing face as 0 and living face
as 1. Binary classifiers contain traditional classifiers and
neural networks. Prior works usually rely on hand-crafted
features, such as LBP [10, 11, 22], SIFT [26], SURF [6],
HoG [18, 36], DoG [27, 33] with traditional classifiers,
such as SVM and Random Forest. Since these manually-
engineered features are often sensitive to varying condition,
such as camera devices, lighting conditions and presenta-
tion attack instruments (PAIs), traditional methods often
perform poorly in generalization.
Since then, CNN has achieved great breakthrough with
the help of hardware development and data abundance.
Recently, CNN is also widely used in face anti-spoofing
tasks [21, 23, 14, 12, 19, 25, 35]. However, most of the
deep learning methods simply consider face anti-spoofing
as a binary classification problem with softmax loss. Both
[19] and [25] fine-tune a pre-trained VGG-face model and
take it as a feature extractor for the subsequent classifica-
tion. Nagpal et al. [23] comprehensively study the influ-
ence of different network architectures and hyperparame-
ters on face anti-spoofing. Feng [12] and Li [19] feed dif-
ferent kinds of face images into the CNN network to learn
discriminative features on living faces and spoofing faces.
Depth supervised Methods Compared with binary super-
vised face anti-spoofing methods, depth supervised meth-
ods have a lot of advantages. Atoum [2] utilizes depth
map of face as supervisory signals for the first time. They
propose a two-stream CNN-based approach for face anti-
spoofing, by extracting the local features and holistic depth
maps from the face images. In other words, they combine
depth-based CNN and patch-based CNN from single frame
to obtain discriminative representation to distinguish live
vs. spoof. It shows that depth estimation is beneficial for
modeling face anti-spoofing to obtain promising results es-
pecially on higher-resolution images.
Liu [20] proposes a face anti-spoofing method from a
combination of spatial perspective (depth) and temporal
perspective (rPPG). They regard facial depth as an auxiliary
supervision, along with rPPG signals. For temporal infor-
mation, they use a simple RNN to learn the corresponding
rPPG signals. However, due to the simplicity of sequence-
processing, they have a non-rigid registration layer to re-
move the influence of facial poses and expressions, ignor-
ing that unnatural changes of facial poses or expressions are
significant spoofing cues.
Temporal-based Methods Temporal information plays a
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Figure 2. The schematic diagram of motion and depth variation in
the presentation attack scene.
vital role in face anti-spoofing tasks. [24, 25, 30] focus
on the movement of key parts of the face. For example,
[24, 25] make spoofing predictions based on eye-blinking.
These methods are vulnerable to replay attack since exces-
sively relying on one aspect. Gan [14] proposes a 3D con-
volution network to distinguish the live vs. spoof. 3D con-
volution network is a stacked structure to learn the tempo-
ral features in a supervised pattern, but depends on signifi-
cant amount of data and performs poorly on small database.
Xu [34] proposes an architecture combining LSTM units
with CNN for binary classification. Feng [12] presents a
work that takes optical flow magnitude map and Shearlet
feature as inputs to CNN. Their work shows that optical
flow map presents obvious difference between living faces
and different kinds of spoofing faces. All prior temporal-
based methods are incapable of catching valid temporal in-
formation with a well-designed structure.
3. The Proposed Approach
In this section, firstly, we will introduce the temporal
depth in face anti-spoofing and show the useful patterns
of motion and depth in face anti-spoofing. Then we will
present the proposed temporal PAD method under depth su-
pervision. As shown in Fig. 5, the proposed model mainly
consists of two modules. One is the single-frame part, fo-
cusing on seeking spoofing cues with the static depth super-
vision. The other is the multi-frame part, consisting of opti-
cal flow guided feature block (OFFB) as the short-term mo-
tion module and convolutional gated recurrent units (Con-
vGRU) modeling long-term motion patterns. The model
can explore spoofing cues in both spatial and temporal do-
mains under the depth supervision, successfully.
3.1. Temporal Depth in Face Anti-spoofing
As shown in Fig. 8, there are two image spaces. The
right image space is recording image space, where attackers
use to record others’ faces. The left image space is realistic
image space, where real face recognition systems are. In
the figure, Ca, Cb are the focal points of recording image
space and realistic image space, respectively, fa, fb are cor-
responding focal distances, and zb is the distance between
Cb and the recording image plane (i.e., the screen of re-
play attack or the paper of print attack), while za is the dis-
tance between the focal point and the nearest facial point.
Nl(t), Nm(t), Nr(t) are three points having different dis-
tances to the camera at time t, and Nl(t + ∆t), Nm(t +
∆t), Nr(t + ∆t) are the corresponding points when they
move down vertically by ∆x at time t + ∆t. x is the co-
ordinate in the vertical direction, and ul is the mapping co-
ordinate in the recording image plane. ∆ul represents the
optical flow on the image plane when the point moves down.
u′l,∆u
′
l are values mapped on the realistic image plane by
ul,∆ul, respectively. We have the following two equations
revealing the relation between these variables:
∆u′l
∆u′m
=
d′1
zb
+ 1,
∆u′l
∆u′r
=
d′2
zb
+ 1,
(1)
where just like ∆u′l, ∆u
′
m and ∆u
′
r are optical flow of
Nm(t) and Nr(t) mapping on the realistic image plane, re-
spectively, which are not shown in the figure for simplicity.
And d′1 and d
′
2 are estimated depth difference d1 and d2,
that can be calculated by the optical flow. The other is
d′1
d′2
=
d1
d2
· fa∆x+ (za + d2)∆v
fa∆x+ (za + d1)∆v
, (2)
where ∆v is the distance of the recording image plane
moving down vertically, caused by the shake of attack car-
rier. Here, we only consider vertical direction of movement.
From these relations, we have some important conclusions:
• In real scene, we can obtain the correct estimate of rel-
ative depth: d′1/d
′
2 = d1/d2.
• In print attack scene, ∆u′l = ∆u′m, ∆u′l = ∆u′r. Then
we can use Eq. 1 to show d′1 = 0, d
′
2 = 0, which
suggests the face is a plane.
• In replay attack scene, if ∆v = 0, then d′1/d′2 =
d1/d2. In this case, there is no abnormity of relative
depth. In the meantime, if there are no static spoofing
cues , we call this case Perfect Spoofing Scene(PSS).
However, making up PSS attacks is costly and approx-
imately impossible in practice. Thus we usually as-
sume ∆v 6= 0, where d′1/d′2 6= d1/d2. The estimated
relative depth in attacking scenes is different from that
in real scenes. And ∆v as well as d′1/d
′
2 usually varies
in the long-term sequence. Such variations can also be
taken as a valid spoofing cue.
• If d2 denotes the largest depth difference among facial
points, then d1/d2 ∈ [0, 1], showing that constraining
depth label of living face to [0, 1] is valid. For spoofing
scenes, the abnormal relative depth is too complex to
be computed directly. Therefore, we merely set depth
label of spoofing face to all 0 to distinguish it from liv-
ing label, making the model learn the abnormity under
depth supervision itself.
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Figure 3. The examples of our input and label for single-frame and
multi-frame.
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Figure 4. The kernel Kcontrasti in contrastive depth loss.
More details about the derivation are included in the sup-
plementary material.
3.2. Single-frame Part
Single-frame part is important to learn static spoofing in-
formation. In this work, we train a simple CNN to regress
the depth map instead of traditional classification with soft-
max loss. In the following, we introduce the proposed depth
supervised single-frame architecture in two aspects: depth
generation and network structure.
3.2.1 Depth Generation
We train the single-frame network with facial depth map,
which reveals face location and 3D shape of the face in
the 2D plane image, and extracts useful information in the
recognition of real face or not. To distinguish living faces
from spoofing faces, we normalize living depth map in a
range of [0, 1], while setting spoofing depth map to 0 [20].
In this module, we adopt dense face alignment method
PRNet [13] to estimate the 3D shape of the living face. PR-
Net can be used to project the 3D shape of a complete face
into UV space. Through this method, we obtain a group of
vertices Vn×3 representing n 3D coordinates of facial key-
points. Since these coordinates are sparse when mapped to
the 2D plane image, we interpolate them to obtain dense
face coordinates. By mapping and normalizing the interpo-
lated coordinates to a 2D plane image, the generated facial
depth map can be represented by D ∈ R32×32. Fig. 3 shows
the labels and corresponding inputs of the proposed model.
3.2.2 Network Structure
As shown in Fig. 5, there are three main cascaded blocks
connected after one convolution layer in our single-frame
part. Each block is composed of three convolution layers
and one pooling layer. We resize pooling features to the
pre-defined size of 32 × 32 and concatenate them into one
tensor, which is used to regress the depth map followed by
three subsequent convolutional groups.
Given an original RGB image I256×256×3, we can obtain
the estimated depth map Dsingle ∈ R32×32 from the single-
frame part. Supervised by the generated “ground truth”
depth D ∈ R32×32, we design a novel depth loss with the
following two parts. One is squared Euclidean norm loss
between Dsingle and D for an absolute depth regression:
Labsolutesingle = ||Dsingle − D||22, (3)
and the other is a contrastive depth loss:
Lcontrastsingle =
∑
i
||Kcontrasti  Dsingle − Kcontrasti  D||22,
(4)
where  represents depthwise separable convolution oper-
ation [16], Kcontrasti represents the contrastive convolution
kernel shown in Fig. 4, and i indexes the location of “1”
around “-1”. As shown in Eq. 4 and Fig. 4, the contrastive
depth loss aims to learn the topography of each pixel, which
gives constraints to the contrast from the pixel to its neigh-
bors.
Putting together, the single-frame loss can be written as:
Lsingle = L
absolute
single + L
contrast
single , (5)
where Lsingle is the final loss used in our single-frame part.
3.3. Multi-frame Part
In this part, we expore the short-term and the long-
term motion in temporal domain. Specially, the short-term
motion is extracted by optical flow guided feature block
(OFFB) and the long-term motion is obtained by ConvGRU
module.
3.3.1 Short-term Motion
We use OFF block (OFFB) derived from [32] to extract
short-term motion. The famous brightness constant con-
straint in traditional optical flow can be formulated as:
I(x, y, t) = I(x+4x, y +4y, t+4t), (6)
where I(x, y, t) represents the brightness at the location
(x, y) of the frame at time t. From Eq. 6, we can derive:
∂I(p)
∂x
vx +
∂I(p)
∂y
vy +
∂I(p)
∂t
= 0, (7)
where p = (x, y, t), vx and vy represent the two dimen-
sional velocity of the pixel at p. ∂I(p)∂x ,
∂I(p)
∂y and
∂I(p)
∂t are
Figure 5. The pipeline of proposed architecture. The inputs are consecutive frames in a fixed interval. Our single-frame part aims to
extract features at various levels and to output the single-frame estimated facial depth. OFF blocks take single-frame features from two
consecutive frames as inputs and calculate short-term motion features. Then the final OFF features are fed into the ConvGRUs to obtain
long-term motion information, and output the residual of single-frame facial depth. Finally, the combined estimated multi-frame depth
maps are supervised by the depth loss and binary loss in respective manners.
Figure 6. The architecture of our OFF block.
gradients of I(p) with respects to x, y and the time, respec-
tively. (vx, vy) is exactly the optical flow. In Eq. 7, we
can see that ~I(p) = [∂I(p)∂x ,
∂I(p)
∂y ,
∂I(p)
∂t ] is orthogonal to
[vx, vy, 1]. Obviously, ~I(p) is guided by the optical flow.
By replacing image I by features level in equations above,
~I(p) can be reformulated as:
~F (I;w; t)(p) =[
∂F (I;w; t)(p)
∂x
,
∂F (I;w; t)(p)
∂y
,
∂F (I;w; t)(p)
∂t
],
(8)
where F is the extracted feature from image I , and w is the
parameters of the feature extraction function. ~F (I;w; t)(p)
is called optical flow guided features (OFF) [32], which en-
codes spatial and temporal gradients guided by the feature-
level optical flow.
Different from OFF [32], we add extra spatial and tem-
poral gradients and morphological information into our own
OFF block (OFFB). As shown in Fig. 6, there are five sub-
modules: Fl(t), FSl (t), F
S
l (t+4t), FTl (t), OFFBl−1(t),
where Fl(t) is reduced from the original single-frame fea-
ture FOl (t) at feature level l and time t to get foundamental
morphological information, FSl (t) and F
S
l (t+4t) are the
spatial gradients at time t and t+4t, FTl (t) is the temporal
gradient between time t and t + 4t, and OFFBl−1(t) is
the OFFB feature from the previous feature level l − 1. To
reduce the training burden, we introduce a reduction opera-
tor – 1 × 1 convolution layer – at the original feature. We
concatenate all of the five sub-modules, and feed them into
a 3 × 3 convolution layer to reduce the feature dimension
and establish OFFBl(t). More details about spatial gradi-
ent FSl (t) and temporal gradient F
T
l (t) can refer to [32].
In the following of this paper, we denote the output of the
final OFF block by OFFB(t).
3.3.2 Long-term Motion
As a short-term motion feature, OFFB feature primarily
captures the motion information between two consecutive
frames, whereas has difficulty in fusing long-sequence mo-
tion. In this regard, we resort to ConvGRU module to gain
the long-term motion.
GRU [9] derives from Long Short-term Memory
(LSTM) [15], which has simpler structure and fewer train-
able parameters. Similar to LSTM, GRU aims to process
long sequence information as well.
However, normal GRU neglects the spatial information
in its hidden units. Thus, we should take into account the
convolution operation in the hidden layers to model the
spatiotemporal sequences, and thus propose the Convolu-
tion Gated Recurrent Units (ConvGRU) related to ConvL-
STM [31]. The ConvGRU can be described below:
Rt = σ(Kr ⊗ [Ht−1, Xt]),
Ut = σ(Ku ⊗ [Ht−1, Xt]),
Hˆt = tanh(Khˆ ⊗ [Rt ∗Ht−1, Xt]),
Ht = (1− Ut) ∗Ht−1 + Ut ∗ Hˆt, (9)
where Xt, Ht, Ut and Rt are the matrix of input, output,
update gate and reset gate, Kr,Ku,Khˆ are the kernels in
the convolution layer,⊗ is convolution operation, ∗ denotes
element wise product, and σ is the sigmoid activation func-
tion. By feeding {OFFB(t)}Nf−1 into {Xt}Nf−1, we set
up depth maps {Dtmulti}Nf−1, where Dtmulti = Ht and Nf
denotes the number of input frames. Then, based on the
residual idea, we integrate the single depth map and multi
depth map:
Dtfusion = α ·Dtsingle + (1− α) ·Dtmulti, α ∈ [0, 1] (10)
where α is the weight of Dtsingle in D
t
fusion. Finally, we
build up the set of multi-frame depth maps {Dtfusion}Nf−1.
3.3.3 Multi-frame Loss
We make the final decision to discriminate live vs. spoof
in the multi-frame part. Nevertheless, in view of the poten-
tially unclear depth map, we hereby consider a binary loss
when looking for the difference between living and spoof-
ing depth map. Note that the depth supervision is decisive,
whereas the binary supervision takes an assistant role to dis-
criminate the different kinds of depth maps. In this regard,
we establish the following multi-frame loss:
Labsolutemulti (t) = ||Dtfusion − Dt||22, (11)
Lcontrastmulti (t) =
∑
i
||Kcontrasti  Dtfusion−
Kcontrasti  Dt||22,
(12)
Ldepthmulti =
Nf−1∑
t
(Labsolutemulti (t) + L
contrast
multi (t)), (13)
Lbinarymulti = −Bt ∗ log(fcs([{Dtfusion}Nf−1])), (14)
Lmulti = β · Lbinarymulti + (1− β) · Ldepthmulti, (15)
where Dt and Bt are depth label and binary label at time t,
[{Dtfusion}Nf−1] is the concatenated depth maps of Nf −1
frames, fcs denotes two fully connected layers and one
softmax layer after the concatenated depth maps, which out-
puts the logits of two classes, β is the weight of binary loss
in the final multi-frame loss Lmulti. In Eq. 14, we use cross
entropy loss to calculate the binary loss. In Eq. 15, we sim-
ply take a sum of the binary loss and depth loss.
4. Experiment
4.1. Databases and Metrics
4.1.1 Databases
Four databases - OULU-NPU [7], SiW [20], CASIA-
MFSD [37], Replay-Attack [8] are used in our experiment.
OULU-NPU [7] is a high-resolution database, consisting of
4950 real access and spoofing videos. This database con-
tains four protocols to validate the generalization of models.
SiW [20] contains more live subjects and three protocols are
used for testing. CASIA-MFSD [37] and Replay-Attack [8]
are databases which contain low-resolution videos. We use
these two databases for cross testing.
4.1.2 Metrics
In OULU-NPU and SiW dataset, we follow the original
protocols and metrics for a fair comparison. OULU-NPU
and SiW utilize 1) Attack Presentation Classification Error
Rate APCER, which evaluates the highest error among
all PAIs(e.g. print or display), 2) Bona Fide Presentation
Classification Error Rate BPCER, which evaluates error
of real access data, and 3) ACER [17], which evaluates the
mean of APCER and BPCER:
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
. (16)
HTER is adopted in the cross testing between CASIA-
MFSD and Repaly-Attack, which evaluates the mean of
False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate
(FAR):
HTER =
FRR+ FAR
2
. (17)
4.2. Implementation Details
4.2.1 Training Strategy
The proposed method combines the single-frame part and
multi-frame part. Two-stage strategy is applied in the train-
ing process. Stage 1: We train the single-frame part by the
single-frame depth loss, in order to learn a fundamental rep-
resentation. Stage 2: We fix the parameters of the single-
frame part, and finetune the parameters of multi-frame part
by the depth loss and binary loss. Note that the diverse
data should be adequately shuffled for the stability of train-
ing and generalization of the learnt model. The network
is fed by Nf frames, which are sampled by a interval of
three frames. This sampling interval makes sampled frames
maintain enough temporal information in the limitation of
GPU memory.
4.2.2 Testing Strategy
For the final classification score, we feed the sequen-
tial frames into the network and obtain depth maps
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
CPqD 2.9 10.8 6.9
GRADIANT 1.3 12.5 6.9
FAS-BAS [20] 1.6 1.6 1.6
OURs 2.5 0.0 1.3
2
MixedFASNet 9.7 2.5 6.1
FAS-BAS [20] 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRADIANT 3.1 1.9 2.5
OURs 1.7 2.0 1.9
3
MixedFASNet 5.3±6.7 7.8±5.5 6.5±4.6
OURs 5.9±1.9 5.9±3.0 5.9±1.0
GRADIANT 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4
FAS-BAS [20] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5
4
Massy HNU 35.8±35.3 8.3±4.1 22.1±17.6
GRADIANT 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
FAS-BAS [20] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
OURs 14.2±8.7 4.2±3.8 9.2±3.4
Table 1. The results of intra testing on four protocols of OULU-
NPU [7].
{Dtfusion}Nf−1 and the living logits bˆ in fcs(Dtfusion).
The final living score can be obtained by:
score = β · bˆ+ (1− β) ·
∑Nf−1
t ||Dtfusion ∗Mtfusion||1
Nf − 1 ,
(18)
where β is the same as that in equation 15, Mtfusion is the
mask of face at frame t , which can be generated by the
dense face landmarks in PRNet [13], and the second module
denotes that we compute the mean of depth values in the
facial areas as one part of the score.
4.2.3 Hyperparameter Setting
We implement our proposed method in Tensorflow [1], with
a learning rate of 3e-3 for single-frame part and 1e-2 for
multi-frame part. The batch size of single-frame part is 10
and that of multi-frame part is 2 with Nf being 5 in most
of our experiment, except that batch size being 4 and Nf
being 3 in protocol 2 of OULU-NPU. Adadelta optimizer
is used in our training procedure, with ρ as 0.95 and  as
1e-8. We set α and β to optimal values by our experimental
experience, and according to the anylysis of the following
section that protocol 4 in OULU-NPU is most challenging
to the generalization, we recommend that the parameters
α = 0.8 and β = 0.9 are suitable for the realistic scenes.
4.3. Experimental Comparison
4.3.1 Intra Testing
We compare the performance of intra testing on OULU-
NPU and SiW dataset. OULU-NPU proposes four proto-
cols to evaluate the generalization of the developed face
presentation attack detection (PAD) methods. Protocol 1 is
designed to evaluate the generalization of PAD methods un-
der previously unseen illumination and background scene.
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1 FAS-BAS [20] 3.58 3.58 3.58OURs 0.96 0.50 0.73
2 FAS-BAS [20] 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69OURs 0.08±0.17 0.21±0.16 0.15±0.14
3 FAS-BAS [20] 8.31±3.81 8.31±3.80 8.31±3.81OURs 3.10±0.79 3.09±0.83 3.10±0.81
Table 2. The results of intra testing on three protocols of SiW [20].
Method Train Test Train TestCASIA-
MFSD
Repaly-
Attack
Repaly-
Attack
CASIA-
MFSD
Motion [11] 50.2 47.9
LBP-1 [11] 55.9 57.6
LBP-TOP [11] 49.7 60.6
Motion-Mag [3] 50.1 47.0
Spectral cubes [28] 34.4 50.0
CNN [35] 48.5 45.5
LBP-2 [4] 47.0 39.6
Colour Texture [5] 30.3 37.7
FAS-BAS [20] 27.6 28.4
OURs 17.5 24.0
Table 3. The results of cross testing between CASIA-MFSD and
Replay-Attack. The evaluation metric is HTER(%).
Protocol 2 is designed to evaluate the generalization of PAD
methods under unseen attack medium, such as unseen print-
ers or displays. Protocol 3 utilizes a Leave One Camera
Out (LOCO) protocol, in order to study the effect of the in-
put camera variation. Protocol 4 considers all above factors
and integrates all the constraints from protocols 1 to 3, so
protocol 4 is the most challenging. Table 1 shows that our
proposed method ranks first on three protocols - protocol
1,2,4, and ranks third on protocol 3. We can see that our
model performs well at the generalization of external envi-
ronment and attack mediums, and is slightly worse when it
comes to the input camera variation. It’s worth noting that
our proposed method has the lowest mean and std of ACER
in protocol 4, which is most suitable for the real-life scenar-
ios.
Tab. 2 compares the performance of our method with
FAS-BAS [20] on SiW [20]. According to the purposes of
three protocols on SiW [20] and the results in Tab. 2, we
can see that our method performs great advantages on the
generalization of (1) variations of face pose and expression,
(2) variations of different spoof mediums, (3) cross PAI.
4.3.2 Cross Testing
We utilize CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack dataset to per-
form cross testing. This can be regarded as two testing pro-
tocols. One is training on the CASIA-MFSD and testing
on Replay-Attack, which we name protocol CR; the other
is training on the Replay-Attack and testing on CASIA-
MFSD, which we name protocol RC. In table 3, we see
HTER of our proposed method is 17.5 on protocol CR and
24.0 on protocol RC, reducing 36.6% and 15.5% respec-
tively compared with the previous state of the art. The im-
Module Single-frame OFF-block ConvGRU D-S B-S ACER(%)
Model 1
√ √
4.4
Model 2∗
√ √ √
3.5
Model 2
√ √ √ √
2.3
Model 3∗
√ √ √
3.3
Model 3
√ √ √ √
3.1
Model 4∗
√ √ √ √
1.7
Model 4
√ √ √ √ √
1.3
Table 4. The results of ablation study on protocol 1 of OULU-
NPU. B-S denotes binary-supervision, and D-S denotes depth-
supervision.
Module Depth Loss ACER(%)Euclidean Depth Loss Contrastive Depth Loss
Model 1∗
√
5.8
Model 1
√ √
4.4
Table 5. The results of ablation study on the influence of con-
trastive depth loss on protocol 1 of OULU-NPU.
provement of performance on cross testing demonstrates the
generalization and superiority of our proposed method.
4.3.3 Ablation Study
We implement experiment on seven architectures to demon-
strate the advantages of our proposed sequential structure
under the supervision of depth. As shown in table 4, Model
1 is the single-frame part of our method. Model 2 com-
bines single-frame CNN with OFFB under binary supervi-
sion and depth supervision. Model 3 combines single-frame
CNN with ConvGRU under binary supervision and depth
supervision. Model 2∗ and model 3∗ discard the binary su-
pervision. Model 4 is our complete architecture, integrating
all modules. Model 4∗ discards binary supervision com-
pared with model 4. Comparing ACER of model 2∗ and
model 3∗ with that of model 1, we see that our OFFB mod-
ule and ConvGRU module both improve the performance
of face anti-spoofing. And the ACER of model 4∗ shows
that the combination of OFFB module and ConvGRU mod-
ule has more positive effects. Via discarding the binary su-
pervision, we test the effect of binary supervision on our
model 2∗, 3∗ and 4∗. In this model, we find that multi-frame
model with simple depth supervision can also outperform
the single-frame model and binary supervision indeed as-
sists the model to distinguish live vs. spoof.
In table 5, we study the influence of contrastive depth
loss. Model 1 is our single-frame model supervised by
both the euclidiean depth loss and the contrastive depth loss,
while model 1∗ is supervised only by euclidiean depth loss.
Comparing model 1 with model 1∗, we can see that con-
trastive depth loss can improve the generalization of our
model.
Moreover, the inference of the model 1 costs around 18
ms and that of model 5 costs around 96 ms, which indicates
that our method is efficient enough to be applied in reality.
Real Print1 Print2 Replay1 Replay2
RGB
Single-
frame
Map
Multi-
frame
Map
D-score: 0.368 D-score: 0.000 D-score: 0.000 D-score: 0.067 D-score: 0.399
D-score: 0.610 D-score: 0.309 D-score: 0.403 D-score: 0.444 D-score: 0.498
Figure 7. The generated results of a group of hard samples in
OULU-NPU. D-score denotes the living score calculated by the
mean of depth values in facial area, which is the depth subpart in
equation 18.
4.3.4 Qualitative Analysis
Figure 7 presents the generated depth maps of a group of
hard samples for the same person ID in OULU-NPU. From
figure 7, we can see that our multi-frame maps are more
complete than single-frame maps in real scenes. Although
the multi-frame maps in spoofing scenes are visually nois-
ier than those in the single-frame maps, the discrimination is
obvious when only considering the multi-frame maps them-
selves. Specially, in single-frame maps, the D-score of real
scene is 0.368, which is lower than that of replay2 scene.
This is probably caused by the illumination condition in re-
play2 scene. By contrast, in multi-frame maps, the D-score
of real scene is higher than the D-scores in all of the at-
tack scenes. We can observe the discrimination among the
multi-frame maps obviously.
It’s worth noting that this group of images are results
of hard samples, which is failure case in single frame but
success case in multi frame. We use residual architecture,
adding the multi-frame depth to the single-frame depth,
which leads to the depth values in multi frame are higher
than those of single frame.
5. Discussion
We only discuss a simple case of equal motion in ver-
tical dimension in Sec. 3.1. In reality, the facial variation
and motion are more complex, including forward/backward
motion, rotation, deformation and so on. In these cases, we
still assume that there are discriminative patterns of tempo-
ral depth and motion between living and spoofing faces in
the temporal domain. Extension of theory and application
on these aspects is our future research. Face anti-spoofing
based on facial motion and depth is indeed promising and
valuable.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of motion and
depth in presentation attack detection. According to the
analysis, we propose a novel face anti-spoofing method,
which is depth supervised and consists of adequate tempo-
ral information. To seek the spatiotemporal information, we
take OFF block as short-term motion module and ConvGRU
as long-term motion module, and then combine them into
our architecture. Our proposed method can discover spoof
patterns efficiently and accurately under depth-supervision.
Extensive experimental results demonstrate the superiority
of our method.
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Appendix
A. Temporal Depth in Face Anti-spoofing
In this section, we use some simple examples to explain
that exploiting temporal depth and motion is reasonable in
the face anti-spoofing task.
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Figure 8. The schematic diagram of motion and depth variation in
different scenes.
A.1. Basic Scene
As shown in Fig. 8(a), node C denotes the camera focus.
Image P lane represents the image plane of camera. N(t)
is one facial point at time t, and N(t + ∆t) is the corre-
sponding point when N(t) moves down vertically for ∆x
at time t+ ∆t. For example, N(t) can be the point of nose
or ear. f denotes the focal distance, and z is the horizontal
distance from the focal point to the point N(t). u and x are
the corresponding coordinates in vertical dimension. When
N(t) moves down vertically to N(t+ ∆t) for ∆x, the mo-
tion can be reflected on the image plane as ∆u. According
to the camera model, we can obtain:
x
u
=
z
f
,
⇔u = fx
z
.
(19)
When N(t) moves down vertically for ∆x to N(t + ∆t),
the ∆u can be achieved:
∆u =
f∆x
z
. (20)
As shown in Fig. 8(b), to distinguish points Nl, Nm and
Nr, we transform Eq. 20 and get ∆ul, ∆um and ∆ur (∆um
and ∆ur are not shown in the figure):
∆ul =
f∆x
z
,
∆um =
f∆x
z + d1
,
∆ur =
f∆x
z + d2
,
(21)
where d1 and d2 are the corresponding depth difference.
From Eq. 21, there are:
∆ul
∆um
=
z + d1
z
=
d1
z
+ 1,
∆ul
∆ur
=
z + d2
z
=
d2
z
+ 1.
(22)
Removing z from Eq. 22, d1/d2 can be obtained:
d1
d2
=
∆ul
∆um
− 1
∆ul
∆ur
− 1
, (23)
In this equation, we can see that the relative depth d1/d2
can be estimated by the motion of three points, when d2 6=
0. The equations above are about the real scenes. In the
following, we will introduce the derivation of attack scenes.
A.2. Attack Scene
A.2.1 What if the attack carriers move?
As shown in Fig. 8(c), there are two image spaces in attack
scenes: one is recording image space, where we replace z, f
by za, fa, and the other is realistic image space, where we
replace z, f by zb, fb. In the recording image space, it’s
similar to Eq. 21:
∆ul =
fa∆x
za
,
∆um =
fa∆x
za + d1
,
∆ur =
fa∆x
za + d2
,
(24)
where ∆ul,∆um,∆ur are the magnitude of optical flow
when three points Nl(t), Nm(t), Nr(t) move down verti-
cally for ∆x.
In the realistic image space, there are:
∆u′l =
fb∆xl
zb
,
∆u′m =
fb∆xm
zb
,
∆u′r =
fb∆xr
zb
,
(25)
where ∆xl, ∆xm and ∆xr are the motion of three points
on the recording image plane, and ∆ul,∆um,∆ur are the
corresponding values mapping on the realistic image plane.
Actually, there are ∆xl = ∆ul,∆xm = ∆um,∆xr =
∆ur, if the recording screen is static. Now, a vertical mo-
tion ∆v is given to the recording screen, just as ∆xl =
∆ul + ∆v,∆xm = ∆um + ∆v,∆xr = ∆ur + ∆v. By
inserting ∆v, we transform Eq. 25 into:
∆u′l =
fafb∆x+ zafb∆v
zazb
,
∆u′m =
fafb∆x+ (za + d1)fb∆v
(za + d1)zb
,
∆u′r =
fafb∆x+ (za + d2)fb∆v
(za + d2)zb
,
(26)
Due to that only ∆u′l,∆u
′
m,∆u
′
r can be observed directly
in the sequential images, we can estimate the relative depth
via ∆u′l,∆u
′
m,∆u
′
r. So we leverage Eq. 23 to estimate the
relative depth d′1/d
′
2:
d′1
d′2
=
∆u′l
∆u′m
− 1
∆u′l
∆u′r
− 1
, (27)
and then we can insert Eq. 26 into Eq. 27 to get:
d′1
d′2
=
d1
d2
· fa∆x+ (za + d2)∆v
fa∆x+ (za + d1)∆v
. (28)
According to equations above, some important conclusions
can be summarized:
• If ∆x = 0, the scene can be recognized as print attack
and Eq. 28 will be invalid, for ∆u′l = ∆u
′
r, and the
denominator in Eq. 27 will be zero. So here we use
Eq. 26 and
∆u′l
∆u′m
=
d′1
zb
+ 1,
∆u′l
∆u′r
=
d′2
zb
+ 1,
(29)
to obtain:
d′1 = d
′
2 = 0. (30)
In this case, it’s obvious that the facial relative depth is
abnormal and the face is fake.
• If ∆x 6= 0, the scene can be recognized as replay at-
tack.
– If ∆v = 0, there is:
d′1
d′2
=
d1
d2
. (31)
In this case, if these two image planes are paral-
lel and the single-frame model can not detect the
static spoof cues, the model will fail in the task
of face anti-spoofing, owing to that the model is
hard to find the abnormality of relative depth esti-
mated from the facial motion. We call this scene
Perfect Spoofing Scene(PSS). Of course, mak-
ing up PSS will cost a lot and is approximately
impossible in practice.
– If ∆v 6= 0 and we want to meet Eq. 31, the fol-
lowing equation should be satisfied:
fa∆x+ (za + d2)∆v
fa∆x+ (za + d1)∆v
= 1, (32)
then,
(d2 − d1)∆v = 0,
⇔d2 − d1 = 0, if ∆v 6= 0.
(33)
However, in our assumption, d1 6= d2, so:
d′1
d′2
6= d1
d2
. (34)
This equation indicates that relative depth can’t
be estimated preciously, if the attack carrier
moves in the replay attack. And ∆v usually
varies when attack carrier moves in the long-term
sequence, leading to the variation of d′1/d
′
2. This
kind of abnormality is more obvious along with
the long-term motion.
• If d2 denotes the largest depth difference among facial
points, then d1/d2 ∈ [0, 1], showing that constraining
depth label of living face to [0, 1] is valid. As ana-
lyzed above, for spoofing scenes, the abnormal relative
depth usually varies over time, so it is too complex to
be computed directly. Therefore, we merely set depth
label of spoofing face to all 0 to distinguish it from liv-
ing label, making the model learn the abnormity under
depth supervision itself.
A.2.2 What if the attack carriers rotate?
As shown in Fig. 8(d), we rotate the recording image plane
for degree θ. ul2, ul1 are the coordinates of Nl(t), Nl(t +
∆t) mapping on the recording image plane. The two black
points at the right end of green double arrows on recording
image plane (vertical) will reach the two black points at the
left end of green double arrow on recording image plane
(rotated), when the recording image plane rotates. And the
corresponding values ul2, ul1 will not change after rotation.
For convenient computation, we still map the rotated points
to the vertical recording image plane. And the coordinates
after mapping are u′l2, u
′
l1. c1, c2, h are the corresponding
distances shown in the figure. According to the relationship
of the foundamental variables, we can obtain:
h = ul1 cos θ,
zb
c1
=
u′l1
h
,
c2 = ul1 sin θ,
c1 + c2 = zb.
(35)
Deriving from equations above, we can get u′l1:
u′l1 =
zbul1 cos θ
zb − ul1 sin θ , (36)
and u′l2 can also be calculated by imitating Eq. 36:
u′l2 =
zbul2 cos θ
zb − ul2 sin θ . (37)
Subtract u′l1 from u
′
l2, the following is achieved:
u′l2 − u′l1 = (ul2 − ul1) ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) .
(38)
Obviously, ul2 − ul1 = ∆ul. We define u′l2 − u′l1 = ∆uθl .
And then we get the following equation:
∆uθl = ∆ul ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ul1 sin θ)[zb − (ul1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
∆uθm = ∆um ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − um1 sin θ)[zb − (um1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
∆uθr = ∆ur ·
zb
2 cos θ
(zb − ur1 sin θ)[zb − (ur1 + ∆ul) sin θ] ,
(39)
where the relationship between ∆uθm,∆u
θ
r and
Nm(t), Nr(t) are just like that between ∆uθl and Nl(t),
as well as um1, ur1. Note that for simplification, we only
discuss the situation that ul1, um1, ur1 are all positive.
Reviewing Eq. 25, We can confirm that ∆xl = ∆uθl ,
∆xm = ∆u
θ
m, ∆xr = ∆u
θ
r . According to Eq. 27, the final
d′1/d
′
2 can be estimated:
d′1
d′2
=
∆ul
∆um
· β1 − 1
∆ul
∆ur
· β2 − 1
=
(
d1
za
+ 1) · β1 − 1
(
d2
za
+ 1) · β2 − 1
, (40)
where β1 and β2 can be represented as:
β1 =
(zb − um1 sin θ)(zb − um2 sin θ)
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) ,
β2 =
(zb − ur1 sin θ)(zb − ur2 sin θ)
(zb − ul1 sin θ)(zb − ul2 sin θ) ,
(41)
where ul2 = ul1 + ∆ul, um2 = um1 + ∆um, ur2 = ur1 +
∆ur. Observing Eq. 40, we can see if β1 < 1, β2 > 1 or
β1 > 1, β2 < 1, there will be d′1/d
′
2 6= d1/d2, .
Now, we discuss the sufficient condition of β1 < 1, β2 >
1. When um1 > ul1, um2 > ul2, ur1 < ul1, ur2 < ul2, the
β1 < 1, β2 > 1 can be established. Similar to Eq. 21, the
relationship of variables can be achieved:
faxl1
za
= ul1,
faxl2
za
= ul2,
faxm1
za + d1
= um1,
faxm2
za + d1
= um2,
faxr1
za + d2
= ur1,
faxr2
za + d2
= ur2,
(42)
From Eq. 42 and um1 > ul1, um2 > ul2, we can obtain:
xm1 > xl1 · za + d1
za
,
xm1 + ∆x > (xl1 + ∆x) · za + d1
za
,
(43)
xr1 < xl1 · za + d2
za
,
xr1 + ∆x < (xl1 + ∆x) · za + d2
za
,
(44)
where xl1, xl2, xm1, xm2, xr1, xr2 are corresponding coor-
dinates of Nl(t+ ∆t), Nl(t), Nm(t+ ∆t), Nm(t), Nr(t+
∆t), Nr(t) in the dimension of x in recording image space.
In facial regions, we can easily find corresponding points
Nl(t), Nm(t), which satisfy that d1  za (i.e., d1 = 0) and
xm1 > xl1. In this pattern, Eq. 43 can be established. To
establish Eq. 44, we only need to find point Nr(t), which
satisfies that xr1 < xl1. According to the derivation above,
we can see that there exists cases that d′1/d
′
2 < d1/d2.
And there are also many cases that satisfy d′1/d
′
2 > d1/d2,
which we do not elaborate here. When faces move, the ab-
solute coordinates xl1, xl2, xm1, xm2, xr1, xr2 vary, as well
as β1, β2, leading to the variation of estimated relative depth
of three facial points at different moments, which will not
occur in the real scene. That’s to say, if the realistic image
plane and recording image plane are not parallel, we can
seek cases to detect abnormal relative depth with the help
of abnormal facial motion.
A.2.3 Discussion
One of basis of the elaboration above is that the structure of
face is similar to that of the hill, which is complex, dense
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1 FAS-BAS [20] – – 10.0OURs 2.9 12.5 7.7
2 FAS-BAS [20] – – 14.1OURs 13.6 13.3 13.5
3 FAS-BAS [20] – – 13.8±5.7OURs 18.1±8.7 10.0±6.3 14.0±4.5
4 FAS-BAS [20] – – 10.0±8.8OURs 2.5±3.8 12.5±11.1 7.5±5.5
Table 6. The results of cross testing from SiW [20] to OULU-
NPU [7].
and undulate. This is interesting and worth being exploited
in face anti-spoofing.
Even though we only use some special examples to
demonstrate our viewpoints and assumption, they can still
prove the reasonability of utilizing facial motion to esti-
mate the relative facial depth in face anti-spoofing task. In
this way, the learned model can seek the abnormal relative
depth and motion in the facial regions. And our extensive
experiment demonstrates our assumption and indicates that
temporal depth method indeed improves the performance of
face anti-spoofing.
B. Extra Experiments
B.1. Comparison
In Tab. 6, we show results of cross testing on models
trained on SiW [20] and tested on OULU-NPU [7]. We can
see that our method outperforms FAS-BAS [20] on three
protocols. Our method even decrease 2.3%, 0.6% and 2.4%
of ACER on protocol 1, protocol 2 and protocol 4, respec-
tively. In protocol 3, ACER of our method is 14.0±4.9%,
which is higher than that of FAS-BAS [20] for 0.2%, which
shows that our method is sensitive to the variation of input
cameras. This indicates the future research direction.
B.2. Feature Distribution
As shown in Fig. B, we present distribution of different
kinds of features in our method. The left subfigure is about
the feature of single-frame part. The middle subfigure is
about the feature of OFF block. The right subfigure is about
the feature of ConvGRU. These features are all extracted
from our model 1. We can see that the features are getting
more discriminative from left to right. The intra class dis-
tances are getting nearer from left to right. And the inter
class distances are getting further from left to right. This
indicates that our features of motion are discriminative in
face anti-spoofing.
D1:0.8415
D2:0.3805
D1:0.6848
D2:0.7405
D1:0.6602
D2:0.7664
Figure 9. Distribution of features in different modules in our method. We split all samples into three classes. Red, blue, and green
points denote samples of real, print attack, and replay attack, respectively. D1 is intra class distance where smaller value indicates better
performance, and D2 is inter class distance where larger value indicates better performance. All distances are calculated after normalizing
the features.
